Over the last few decades, China has seen a steep rise in diverse eco city and low carbon city policies. Recently, attention has begun to focus on the perceived shortcomings in the practical delivery of related initiatives, with several publications suggesting a gap between ambitious policy goals and the emerging realities of the newly built environment. To probe this further, M A N U S C R I P T
Introduction
Perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, in China concepts of sustainable urbanization have proliferated among policy-makers, professionals and academics (Caprotti, 2014; de Jong et al., 2015; Joss and Molella, 2013; Wu, 2012) . and Liu et al. (2014) have provided overview analyses of the various initiatives launched by Chinese governmental bodies over the last couple of decades. Before 2000, the Chinese government (national and/or local) had already adopted programs to promote the 'green city', the 'garden city' and the 'national environmental protection model city'. Post-2000, the 'eco-city', the 'low carbon city' and even the 'low carbon eco city' have been added to the list. The number of officially recognized demonstration and model cities across these programs has since risen to several M A N U S C R I P T
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hundreds and keeps on growing. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) initiated an 'eco cities' program; the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) one for 'low carbon cities'; and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) one for 'low carbon eco cities'. In doing so, they have assumed the role of patrons of provinces, cities, districts and counties across the country wishing to become exemplars for sustainable urbanization (see Appendix 1). To date, 92 pilot cities, districts and counties have been recognized by MEP (MEP, 2013b; MEP 2015) ; NDRC has ratified six provinces and 36 cities (NDRC, 2012) ; while MOHURD has signed up two provinces and two cities, plus a further 15 cities through two cooperation programs (one Sino-American, the other Sino-European. These numbers exclude a plethora of additional initiatives and projects initiated directly by local governments without any official recognition or backing by Beijing.
Across these national initiatives, much attention has focused on formulating ambitious policy goals and establishing sophisticated indicator systems (e.g. MEP, 2007) ; this can also be seen reflected in the academic literature (Dong et al., 2015; Price et al., 2013; Li et al., 2009 ).
More recently, however, attention has begun to shift towards perceived shortcomings, if not failure, in the delivery of various eco city 1 initiatives. Several analysts point to not insignificant hiccups and complications in the actual implementation of these policies; this lays bare a significant gap between, on one hand, ambitious policy goals and attractive design and development visions and, on the other, the emerging realities of the newly built environment (Alusi et al., 2010; Pow and Neo, 2013; Caprotti, 2013 Caprotti, , 2014 Hult, 2013 Hult, , 2015 Rapoport, 2014; Joss and Molella, 2013; Chang and Shephard, 2013; de Jong et al., 2013b) .
Similar critique has been raised concerning high-level eco city projects in other parts of Asia, such as South Korea (Shwayri, 2013; Yigitcanlar and Lee, 2014) , Abu Dhabi (Cugurullo, 2013; and India (Joss and Cowley, 2016) . And in Europe, too, the challenge of policy implementation has become apparent, as for example reported in the case of the English eco-town initiative (Tomozeiu and Joss, 2014) and the French national Ecocité program (Boxenbaum et al., 2011) . 1 In the context of this research, the term 'eco city' encompasses the variety of terminology adopted by the various national ministries, including 'low carbon city' and 'low carbon eco city'. See Appendix 1 for full list of initiatives.
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Some analysts (e.g. Bluepath City, 2013; Yin, 2014; Zhou et al., 2014; EU-Asia dialogue, 2014; Yu et al., 2015) interpret the phenomenon of policy implementation gaps essentially as start-up problems to be fixed by perfecting eco city indicator systems, attuning and integrating the use of the various policy instruments deployed by government organizations, and supporting best practice sharing and capacity building. Other analysts take a more critical stance, viewing the new wave of eco city projects and their differently named cousins as not much more than the promotion of real estate and large engineering business interests while casting doubt on the prospects of significantly improving eco-efficiency within existing production modes (e.g. Chien, 2013; Caprotti, 2014; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2014; Rapoport, 2014; Xu, 2015) . Both analyst groups agree that the promotion of sustainable cities through attractive terminology and their global mainstreaming is at least in part illustrative of a wider city branding practice aimed at attracting investors -including foreign ones -and a highly educated workforce Shwayri, 2013; Yigitcanlar and Lee, 2014; Braun et al., 2014; de Jong et al., 2015) , although their views may differ as to the sincerity of the political intentions underlying these sustainable urbanization initiatives and their potential to achieve significant change.
Pinpointing whether sustainable city projects are successes or failures is not straight forward.
In some cases, failure is rather obvious, such as when projects are simply not realized, when ghost towns emerge and stay empty for extended periods of time, when projects run into financial difficulties, or when their (social, economic, environmental) sustainability credentials are evidently questionable. However, in other cases, evaluating success or failure is trickier; for instance, when development and construction activities take place largely according to plan yet some sustainability indicators are not met. In assessing contemporary eco city developments in China, some international analysts have highlighted perceived implementation gaps between original goals and actual achievements, such as in the case of Tianjin Eco-City concerning aspects of social sustainability (public housing), green transport, or biodiversity, among others (e.g. Caprotti, 2014) . In response, some domestic commentators assert that the adoption of eco city initiatives and related indicator frameworks are in themselves a major step forward and that developments, such as Tianjin Eco-City, play an M A N U S C R I P T
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important exemplary role in promoting more sustainable urbanization (Bluepath City, 2013 with the majority of aforementioned publications; instead, we apply a more explicit governance perspective, with particular focus on policy implementation through policy networks. Ever since Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) explained why policy ambitions formulated in Washington DC were dashed in Oakland, implementation has remained a classical topic in public policy. And yet, its significance remains too often neglected in the discussion about why policy failure occurs, including in the case of sustainable urban development. Frequently, the organizational context in which urban sustainability projects take place is ignored; official and unofficial goals pursued by public bodies at various governmental levels are overlooked; the motives and interests of banks, developers, infrastructure builders, engineering consultants and architects are downplayed; the complexity of participation by international actors in local planning -a key feature of many eco city initiatives in China and beyond -is underestimated; and the resources required for policy implementation, and which actors have these at their disposal, are not taken into account. In short, interdependencies among actors in policy networks do not get the attention they deserve (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2015) .
Disregarding these interdependencies is bound to lead to disappointment, but this should be at least partly preventable if the alignment of national policy interests with those of other public and private actors is considered properly and upfront. Adopting this governance perspective, The article is structured as follows: the next section outlines an analytical framework based on the policy network approach, explaining how this helps to map the alignment of the interests of various actors involved in eco city development. In section 3, we summarize
Chinese national policies for eco cities, low carbon cities and low carbon eco cities, and discuss to which extent they address the question of policy implementation 2 . Section 4 then presents four categories of Chinese eco city projects based on the degree to which national governmental recognition and international knowledge transfer come into play alongside local governance mechanisms. In Section 5, we apply our analytical framework to this eco city typology; this allows us to question the usefulness of dominant top-down policy approaches (apart from a few national flagship projects), and it provides for a better understanding of how actors' interest alignments shape policy implementation (gaps). The concluding section 6 offers some suggestions as to how the policy network approach can inform eco city development in China (and beyond) -namely, by shifting attention away from the prevailing technocratic policy perspective to one which better recognizes the importance of policy networks and related resource structures for successful policy implementation.
Policy networks and alignment of actor interests: an analytical framework
The policy network approach is a family of theories, rather than one singly theory; its various strands have in common that they consider policy-making as a process in which multiple players jointly make decisions and depend on each other for their implementation (Hill, 2013) . This mutual dependency arises from the fact that no single actor unilaterally has sufficient legal, financial, organizational and knowledge resources to push through and 2 The three programs analyzed here do not constitute the full range of national programs for sustainable urbanization, but they are the most comprehensive ones. Other programs, such as those for eco industrial parks, sponge cities, eco-civilization demonstration cities and smart cities are either more specialized in scope, and thus less suitable for a broader analysis of policy implementation, or more recent and thus lacking in sufficient analytical data.
execute decisions. Empirical description in these theories often emphasizes the multitude and diversity of policy actors, partially conflicting goals and complementarities of power resources. Prescription tends towards the acknowledgement that this interdependency should be considered upfront and accommodated through the design of interactive decision processes (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975; Kickert et al., 1997; Scharpf, 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009) . Recently, attempts have also been made to apply this approach to the Chinese context (Zheng et al., 2010; Groenleer et al., 2012) . In this article, we mobilize basic conceptual terms, such as 'policy actors' , 'goals' and 'resources' (also known as 'policy instruments' or 'tools of government'), 'interdependency', 'networks' and 'institutions'; while the more sophisticated notions of 'network management', 'network constitution', 'perceptions', 'deadlocks', 'decision-making rounds' and 'policy windows' are intentionally left out, since these can only be studied in detailed case studies.
A policy network analysis applied to the implementation of a given national policy program can proceed as follows:
1. Identifying the relevant policy actors involved in the implementation of the policy in question. These include governmental agencies at various governance levels; but they also entail public enterprises, non-governmental organizations and private entrepreneurs and -importantly in the context of (Chinese) eco city initiatives - (knowledge/information), 'authority' (legal power), 'treasure' (funds), and 'organization' (Hood 1986; Hood and Margetts, 2007 In the present analysis, we do not focus on the implementation process of individual eco city projects as such, but on how national eco city policy programs affect the policy network structures of eco city projects. (Where individual eco city initiatives are highlighted in the text, they can be found listed in Appendix 1 against the corresponding national programs.)
Consequently, while the same basic concepts are used as the ones typically deployed to chart a policy network relating to an individual case study, here they are applied more broadly to policy network structures resulting from national eco city policy programs. Four different types of network structures for eco city projects with different actor positions will be identified; each has differential effects on how national eco city ambitions manifest themselves locally. This typology provides the opportunity to investigate the goals and resources of the various actors within each type of network structure; and to consider to which extent actors' attitudes and behaviors align with what is envisioned in the national policy programs -that is, how the national ministries foresee the role of other (international, national, and local) policy actors within the network structures and view the related implementation process. The typology, then, also prompts us to ask whether various 'local' M A N U S C R I P T
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adopters of national policy might be guided by other, competing policy interests, with the effect of diverting their actions away from the national plans.
While an analysis of policy implementation at systemic level -rather than with focus only on single case studies -is certainly called for, there are nevertheless some methodological challenges involved. For one thing, given the large number of eco city initiatives of one kind or another across China, it is difficult to extract and distil common implementation trends and characteristics from the peculiarities of individual geographic, economic and administrative contexts, unless a large comparative study of multiple cases is undertaken. And for another, it may turn out to be hard to access relevant data, not least in a context where policy implementation is not as yet widely recognized and articulated as a feature of eco city development and where the possibility of implementation gaps or failures is rarely acknowledged. What is more, access to information and data is often severely restricted for those without 'guanxi' (personal networks). In response, the present research is based on the following three sources: (1) an analysis of key official policy documents and assessment reports relating to the three ministries' eco city programs, in terms of the extent to which implementation is a recognized feature (see four indicators above); (2) a review of recent academic publications which present analyses of specific Chinese sustainable city projects and discuss the contexts and reasons for observed implementational success and/or failure;
and (3) 
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This section summarizes the three main Chinese national programs for eco cities, and discusses how they address the issue of policy implementation. As national policies, these programs have an obviously important framing function (although as noted not all eco city projects fall under their direct guidance). In doing so, they point to the policy implementation challenge facing contemporary eco city initiatives in China, especially relating to the preponderance of a rather technocratic understanding of the policy process and, relatedly, a lack of proper recognition of actors other than local government and their respective attitudes and behaviors towards (sustainable) urban development.
The three central ministries dealing with, respectively, environmental protection (MEP), housing and urban-rural development (MOHURD), and overarching national development (NDRC), have each initiated dedicated programs for sustainable city development (see Table   1 ). While each program exhibits specific characteristics, they share one important feature: the responsible ministries promote a practice, whereby local governments are prompted to submit plans from which the ministries select those that fulfill the policy brief; the chosen initiatives are thus elevated to nationally endorsed demonstration projects.
[ Table 1 here]
MEP's eco cities, eco districts and eco counties
The eco city program initiated by the Ministry of Environmental Protection was the first such program that integrated a tailor-made indicator system to define and assess performance (first 
NDRC's low carbon provinces and cities
The low carbon city program is managed by the National Development and Reform
Committee. Its main aim is to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). In 2010, NDRC issued a note on the first phase of pilot low carbon provinces and cities (NDRC, 2010) .
This focused on the promotion of low carbon technologies and industries and explicated what policy interventions are deemed conducive to reaching this goal. NDRC encourages local governments to realize institutional innovation and employ incentives for reducing GHG emissions based on established market mechanisms. Local governments, bidding for status of 'national demonstrator project', are expected to show how they plan to deploy low carbon technologies to transform their industrial structure and promote low carbon buildings, transportation and renewable energy. Upon the initial launch in 2010, five provinces and eight cities were selected. However, the performance of this first batch of demonstrator projects was evaluated as 'not very significant ' (NDRC, 2012) . This evaluation suggests that these proposals had been prepared in a hurry, failing to take into account local specificities and conditions. Furthermore, due to the over-emphasis on economic growth in some pilot areas, the implementation of low carbon measures was neglected relative to what was promised in the original plans. Finally, the absence of any substantial financial support for the selected low carbon provinces and cities hampered the effectiveness of the new policy; as a M A N U S C R I P T
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consequence, most governments of demonstration areas -especially those in less developed regions -were unable to initiate relevant projects. In 2012, NDRC extended the number of demonstrator projects, now comprising a total of six provinces and 36 pilot cities. According to its own evaluation, this second batch of proposals was significantly better prepared (NDRC, 2012) . Furthermore, there has been a better geographic distribution leading to greater regional variety and allowing for the exploration of different approaches to control GHG emissions.
Concerning the question of standardization for low carbon cities, according to Mu (2012) the set of indicators published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2010 is considered the most comprehensive one. It uses a classification of twelve indicators divided up in four groups: low carbon productivity; consumption; resources; and policies. According to this framework, a city can be considered low carbon on a given indicator if its carbon productivity is 20 percent lower relative to the national average. However, neither this nor any other set of standards has to date been officially recognized. This renders problematic performance evaluation, benchmarking, as well as the granting of demonstrator project status.
MOHURD's low carbon eco cities
On its part, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development initiated its 'low carbon eco city' program in 2009 . 
Policy implementation modes
How do the three (MEP/MOHURD/NDRC) eco city programs view policy implementation?
In substantive terms, NDRC's program is the most narrowly defined among the three, with singular focus on GHG emissions; in contrast, MEP's policy is the broadest, encompassing a wide spectrum of sustainability issues, while MOHURD's initiative occupies thematic middle ground. What is arguably a more significant difference in their approach to policy steering is the use of eco-city indicator systems: MEP and NDRC impose their own indicators on local governments; they thus practically hand down the responsibility for evaluating pilot projects to local authorities, albeit against nationally set indicator criteria. MEP's indicator system and procedures have evolved into uniform standards, whereas NDRC has not fully standardized its approach to date. In the both cases, progress with, and the success of, policy implementation are mainly determined based on what local governments report themselves, resulting in varying local reporting practice. On its part, MOHURD does not deploy common indicators and standards, as a consequence of which policy implementation is even more devolved to, and reliant on the self-direction of, local governments.
Rather than providing complementarities between themselves and therefore a coherent overall national policy approach, the three ministries' programs appear to (be designed to) compete with one another. What is more, policy coherence is also undermined by the developmental status of the concepts and methods underpinning the policy programs (Li and Liu, 2011) .
Thus, in spite of the semblance of elaborate indicator systems (in the case of MEP and NDRC), practitioners often report that they still miss clear measureable targets or manuals which they can follow, or a standardized approach stipulating how local governments can implement eco city projects . The implication of this is that while quantification abound, assessment of implementational progress remains problematical:
strictu sensu implementation success or failure can at present not be established in any reliable and transparent manner.
In other respects, the governance approach in the three programs is remarkably similar. The existence and relevance of local governments is recognized: they are seen as loyal drafters of plans and reports working towards eco-civilization progress, rather than pursuing their own potentially conflicting goals as independent actors. Should they not measure or report their information adequately if at all, the national ministries have limited legal, financial, or organizational remedies at their disposal: local governments' compliant participation is assumed as a matter of course. And while the relevance of local governments for implementation is recognized -albeit as loyal adopters of national policy -that of other actors in urban development, such as developers, banks, consultants and residents, is barely addressed (Notably, foreign governments and high-tech companies enjoy a comparatively privileged position in policy implementation, as illustrated by MOHURD) . Since these other actors hardly appear on the radar as co-implementers, their having at their disposal additional resources necessary for policy implementation is a non-issue in all three national programs.
In summary, while the particular details in the governance approach for policy implementation may not be exactly the same for MEP's eco cities, NDRC's low carbon cities, and MOHURD's low carbon eco cities, in one crucial aspect at least they appear alike: they emphasize the role of local governments as executioners of national policy. Local authorities (and their international partners) are assumed to be diligent, cooperative and subservient to nationally defined eco city goals. Other policy actors do not appear to be recognized in any significant ways, nor do their goals and resources. Finally, the use of elaborate technical information systems is promoted through these policies (especially MEP and NDRC), as a main means of monitoring and evaluating progress towards implementation.
Policy implementation practices across eco city types
It should come as little surprise that the practical reality of eco city development is more complex than that envisaged by the aforementioned national programs. The effectiveness of policy implementation hinges on further key factors, including the interests and motives of M A N U S C R I P T
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local authorities which are supposed to enact national policy, as well as other actors drawn into the policy networks, notably investors and developers. Therefore, the wider policy network and interest constellations need to be considered, too. To this end, the following discusses four types of eco city projects in China, which vary in terms of the degree of official government endorsement and in terms of international financial and technology input.
According to Miao and Lang (2014) in their comparative analysis of Tianjin Eco-City and Dongtan eco city, our own previous analysis on the robustness of Sino-foreign organizational collaboration for eco city development (de Jong et al. 2013b) , and the deliberation during the three expert round tables as part of this research, national government endorsement and knowledge transfer from abroad are seen as crucial inducements to high-quality and high-status eco city projects (also see de Jong, 2013; Hult 2013; Wu, 2015) . Moreover, these two factors also tend to reinforce each other's impact, which is why they were adopted as components for our typology. 
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These and similar initiatives are national status projects enjoying the commitment of top-level politicians from both national sides, co-funding from state-owned enterprises, investment companies and developers, and the sharing of know-how and expertise. As a consequence, public officials put in charge of project implementation tend to stay in their positions for extensive periods of time, performance monitoring concerning various eco city indicators is taken seriously. And the initial project scope may be extended to signal project success, since project size and success are seen as closely related in the Chinese context. Hence, for example the Sino-German Qingdao Eco City has been upgraded to province-level project (Shandong) and its area size increased from 10 to 17km 2 . By comparison, for the Sino-Singaporean
Tianjin Eco City an upgrade from currently 31km 2 to 143km 2 is considered, reflecting its high-profile national status.
Calling these projects the most successful does not imply that all about them is fine: on one hand, in terms of social and economic indicators, their project implementation may satisfy most expectations and requirements, and funding challenges are forestalled. On the other, however, environmental and planning commentators, especially Western ones, often find the ecological ambitions disappointing, raising critical questions about the dominance of motorways and the dearth of high-quality public transport facilities in these green-looking suburban neighborhoods situated dozens of kilometers away from central urban districts.
Most Chinese analysts, however, emphasize the high livability of these new town areas, the key importance of providing public services (especially good healthcare and education facilities) to attract middle class residents, and the need for luring green tech companies to these areas to effect the upgrading of the industrial base. Furthermore, they argue for patience in moving towards the improvement of the ecological situation in the country.
Type 2: Limited national government support, paired with occasional foreign involvement
Whether International (formerly Sino-Swedish) Wuxi Eco-City and International (formerly Sino-Dutch) Shenzhen Low Carbon City will ever join the ranks of the type 1 remains to be seen; meanwhile they fall into type 2. Key to this category of Chinese eco city projects is that they are undertaken by financially relatively strong local governments, manage to attract the M A N U S C R I P T projects. This makes them significantly more susceptible to political and financial volatility, since national (or provincial) governments will not go to any particular length to render them successful: the projects essentially remain a local responsibility dependent on local resources.
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As a result, some high profile eco city projects within this category with strong international involvement, such as Dongtan eco city, have officially been put on hold even before construction could commence. Such relative failure may occur for several reasons, including overly ambitious plans, policy and legal conflicts due for example to claiming agricultural land for urban development where this is not permitted, and forced resignations of politicians who have a central role in the projects (Wu, 2012; Chang and Shephard, 2013; de Jong et al., 2013b; Miao and Lang, 2014) . Other reasons for failure may occur when construction is initiated but subsequently slows down or comes to a halt due to, for example, the bankruptcy of the developer(s), the departure of the involved foreign engineering and consultancy partners, the difficulties to integrate planning and coordinate management due to splicing up of plots of lands among multiple developers. Some of these reasons have been in evidence in the case of Tangshan-Caofeidian International (formerly Sino-Swedish) Eco-City (Joss and Molella, 2013 
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City are currently under development and so far appear to be reasonably successful in terms of visible project management progress and delivering several tangible results. In both cases, local government is economically privileged and thus able to pledge considerable investments, while also making efforts to ensure quality control. International expertise and knowledge transfer have lifted the prestige of these projects, but also laid bare some significant misunderstandings between Chinese demand and foreign supply: European partners would hope for more effective influence on the actual outcomes of the planning process; and they would find it difficult to make a business case for their involvement, since generating revenues is often restricted to selling technological equipment while excluding earnings from consultancy. At the same time, the eco city concepts being promoted by these foreign partners are sometimes stylized and tactically repackaged versions of their homegrown (European) experience and practices, and as such ill-suited to the Chinese context. A case in point is 'SymbioCity', which the Swedish players promoted as core concept for both the Tangshan and Wuxi eco city projects.
In spite of type 2's significantly higher vulnerability to project failure, we should add here that even the supposedly 'unsuccessful' examples may be only temporarily stalled: local governments, developers, and prestigious international architects and engineers may have pulled out of Shanghai-Dongtan, Tangshan-Caofeidian and Beijing-Mentougou for the time being, but this does not necessarily imply a complete dead end. Potentially lucrative plots of available land remain open to future urban development and promising ideas developed by world-renowned architects and engineers can be resurrected and revamped. It is probable that for most of these projects, new efforts will eventually be made by different parties to re-launch the same projects, albeit often under a different label and with revised ambitions.
Type 3: Nominal support from national government
The third category relates to provinces, cities and counties that have managed to obtain the status of national eco city/low carbon city/low carbon eco city, but were subsequently unable to translate this into prestigious projects backed by international advisers and systematic reviews by committees to monitor the quality of work. In most cases, these are not the M A N U S C R I P T
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wealthier first-tier cities, but second, third or even fourth tier ones that do not have the resources to make substantial investments in costly environmental solutions. Their main goal is to enhance the visibility and reputation of their locality to investors, industry and future residents; and they try to achieve this by mobilizing an attractive brand name ('eco city').
This is not to say that the efforts to create new sustainable localities are necessarily insincere, but it normally does imply that: cities have fewer financial resources at their disposal; that concerted monitoring of (quality) performance is weak if not entirely absent; that insufficient know-how and expertise is available to boost eco-innovation; and, not least, that dependency on developers for generating public revenues through land-leasing is a primary driver of related eco city projects. Examples of type 3 sustainable city initiatives abound (see Appendix 1), but they tend to be less conspicuous and thus relatively understudied compared with types 1 and 2. Although their environmental performance is hardly ever impressive (see Introduction), their social and economic success rates vary. Some are barely distinct from regular urban construction projects and, as such, look alike. Others may evolve into something more notorious: ghost towns. While the latter are generally viewed negatively, some commentators have cautioned against considering failure too soon, as it may take some time for new urban developments to become inhabited with residents and businesses. Thus, ghost towns may not be the end, but the beginning, of urban development (Shepard, 2015) .
Nevertheless, more often than not these urban projects turn out to be rather faceless new towns with limited identity and social and cultural appeal (Li and Liu, 2011; Hulshof and Roggeveen, 2011) . They end up not offering the attractive cosmopolitan feel originally promised, but become mediocre towns for up-rooted workers migrating into new urban centers from further afield (Hsing, 2010) .
Type 4: Local initiatives without national government support
Many localities have developed sustainable urban development initiatives, but have not obtained any support, or strived for recognition, from national or provincial government.
Their features do not differ much from type 3 projects, except that they have no official status anywhere beyond their own city or town, and that project progress is not systematically reported and monitored. They are, therefore, an even more complicated category to capture M A N U S C R I P T
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than type 3, with little empirical research to go by. A small number of type 4 projects have attracted media attention in recent years, such as Huangbaiyu eco village and Kunming-Chenggong eco city. Collecting evidence can prove difficult, since information is typically removed from websites and official documents following apparent project failure. In the case of Kunming-Chenggong, it initially appeared as if it is evolving into a ghost-town, although more recently policy ambitions have been scaled down and housing sales have gone up (Miller, 2012) . As to Huangbaiyu, it has become common knowledge that the designers and developers failed to address the wishes and needs of their future inhabitants (May, 2008; Ren, 2013; Chien, 2013 concept. However, it failed due to the fact that housing and social amenities were both inconveniently located and inappropriate for local life styles. Since it was promoted as a technical project rather than embedded in established urban planning, and since it lacked support from higher government levels, the monitoring of quality and financial feasibility were compromised, too.
Implementation of eco city programs as interaction in policy networks
Given the central role of national programs in eco city development, it is tempting to see the national ministries as the dominant actors in sustainable urban development in China. They can assume if not claim hierarchical control over local governments by demanding the active application of and engagement with, their policy protocols and related indicator systems and procedural rules. However, such a narrative of policy centricity risks being overly simplistic and negligent of the complexity of the policy processes at work in Chinese eco city development. For a start, various national ministries compete with one another in their attempts to attract local government initiatives; and their different indicator systems have carved up the analytical scenery for eco city reporting into fragmented central-local silo systems. Furthermore, although at first sight it appears as if national ministries are in a strong steering position because they can select a few promising demonstrator cities from among many applicants and insist that local governments should apply their indicators as they stipulate, in reality those national ministries also need to prove that their programs are M A N U S C R I P T
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successful. Hence, they depend on strong and reliable applicants able to develop eco cities that can be sold as 'world standard' demonstrator projects. The tendency of quite a few demonstrator initiatives to claim to develop and enforce standards without, however, properly doing so, coupled with the risk that data are manipulated ('gaming the system') in progress reports with little consequence, must be a serious concern for national ministries.
The question arises as to why many local governments seem reluctant to fully subscribe to eco city policies, and especially aspects relating to environmental sustainability, and why in practice they tend to perform below expectation. The question then also arises why the national government seems limited in its ability to redress this situation of relative implementation failure. The answer appears to lie in the tendency that eco city development is intricately caught up in the mechanisms governing real estate development: local governments promote urban development projects because these boost both local GDP growth and increase revenues from leasing out land to developers (Zheng, 2014) . Doing so is seen not only as benefitting the careers of top officials, but is also imperative for generating much needed income: no less than half of local government revenues stem from land-leasing (Tao et al., 2010; Chien, 2013; Bai et al., 2014) . Developers engage in building real estate with the help of soft loans from publicly owned banks responding to the trend of rapid urbanization in the country. Both residents and corporations are expected to respond with substantial in-migration to these new areas, although over fifteen percent of the housing stock in China is unoccupied according to some estimates (Wall Street Journal, 2014, based on Southwestern University of Finance and Economics).
It is within these broader institutional and networking contexts that the implementation of national eco city policy programs should be considered and analyzed. From the policy network perspective, the local context in which the ministerial policies are adoptedincluding its involved actors, their goals, resources and interdependencies -can now be considered in an integrated manner. This is done below in opposite order -from eco city type 4 to type 1 -reflecting the growing complexity of the network structure at work.
Type 4: Local initiatives without national government support
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The simplest form of a policy network is seen in type 4 projects. A network here will typically consist of a city government taking the lead in attempting to develop into an eco city, and thus being the central player. Its formal goal is to create an attractive 'green' new town surrounded by an ecologically improved urban environment dominated by high-tech, low-carbon industries. Its informal goal is likely to be to earn substantial income from leasing out land to developers. Its main resources are arable land, over which it has legal competencies to decide whether it be opened up for urban development. It is not an exaggeration to state that the dependency on revenues from developers centrally defines what local governments are receptive to. Thus, it should come as little surprise that city governments in this category rather turn to developers than national ministries for realizing their initiatives and projects. Likewise, developers depend on the land issued by local government, alongside a dependency on banks to provide attractive loans and, of course, reliance on future residents and companies to create demand for real estate. In such a setting, it is highly unlikely that central government policy programs will fundamentally alter the orientation that local governments have in relation to the private sector. Environmentally friendly solutions are only likely to emerge if developers value them; and since environmental sustainability represents mostly a cost to developers, it is unlikely to become a voluntary priority. In short, type 4 projects find themselves in a comparatively disadvantageous policy network for ambitious eco city projects. Strictly speaking, the national eco city programs are M A N U S C R I P T
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not concerned with this type of eco city project and can, therefore, not be expected to anticipate to what extent other policy actors have divergent goals or how they deploy their resources in ways contrary to national 'eco' progress ambitions.
Type 3: Nominal support from national government
In type 3 projects, the actor network is similar to that of type 4 initiatives, but with the crucial difference that the national government (one of the ministries) becomes involved through the awarding of eco city demonstrator status. This increases a project's relative attractiveness to developers as well as future occupants of the new urban space. The recognition status prompts more resources to go towards quality enhancement, because wealthier residents and cleaner high-tech companies are willing to pay a premium for green surroundings and lower pollution levels. Local governments have to put substantial efforts into promoting themselves as an eco city and being selected as a nationally recognized demonstrator city, but they seem content to do so: it adds to their status, and if the experiment succeeds it will even position them as 'best practice' exemplar which, in turn, can be used to spearhead sustainable urbanization elsewhere in the country (and beyond). Such awards are not only a vital instrument in promoting the city in question in the economic rat-race among cities, but they are also believed to be an essential asset for the senior political and administrative leaders when seeking promotion to higher positions. If previously it was solely GDP growth that mattered, in recent years the explicit 'eco' progress agenda has added some environmental indicators to the set of KPIs on which top officials in the CCP nomenclature are assessed.
However, in spite of the growing influence of the 'eco' discourse in the promotion of real estate assets in type 3 projects (as compared to type 4 ones), the actor constellation and the interdependencies have not been fundamentally altered: the official recognition granted by the national ministries only influences the distribution of resources at the margins. This is currently still the exception rather than the norm for new town developments in China;
it requires concerted planning, serious quality control and extensive funding from local governments. The resource availability of cities involved in type 2 projects ensures that neighborhoods with good public facilities and embracing an environmental agenda can be created. The level of investment required is considerable, but the cities in question are willing to back these projects -as do new residents hoping for premium real estate value -based on the prospect of a markedly higher quality of urban life. As a result, the projects' promoters can afford to be selective concerning the kinds of companies and residents (typically ones with higher levels of education and purchasing power) they wish to attract.
Overall, the essential exchange relation in this network type remains focused on that between the city government and developers; however, other actors, in particular national ministries and foreign firms, play a fairly central role, too, and can be seen to influence policy implementation processes and outcomes. Nevertheless, while public facilities and urban space may be superior in comparison with conventional developments, advanced environmental sustainability as such may not be much of a priority. By entering into a formal relationship with a foreign government -typically ones with an acclaimed track record of sustainable urban development -and facilitating the involvement of related developers, constructors and consultants, the Chinese central government seeks to secure and warrant success. In doing so, the supported projects are rendered more prestigious, comprehensive and consequently more expensive than comparable projects of types 2-4.
Systematic quality control becomes essential to the credibility of type 1 projects, resulting in detailed indicator frameworks, matched with systematic monitoring and reporting systems with the possibility of taking corrective action if deemed necessary. Yet, here again, economic priorities can be expected to trump environmental ones, since these eco city projects still essentially constitute real estate development and the main incentive for future residents is likely to be on superior public services and amenities (top-level schools and hospitals, along with attractive neighborhoods and ample green space) promoting urban well-being. Environmental innovation, thus, comes to depend heavily on the willingness of governmental actors to invest specifically in environmental sustainability measures.
In summary, the core axis in policy networks for eco city development in China is that between local governments and developers exchanging land for revenues, which others have described as 'local growth coalitions' (Zhu, 1999) or 'local growth machines' (Wu, 2015) . In M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT most cases, the term 'eco city' and related sister terms are used more for city branding purposes than fundamentally to promote an environmental agenda. This phenomenon takes place in an unfettered way in type 4 projects. In types 3 and 2, central government organizations attempt in varying degrees to influence the choices that local governments make, by providing incentives to make sustainability a serious consideration. However, this is mostly done in a top-down manner, which overemphasizes a rational planning mode and the technocratic application of analytical methods; conversely, it underemphasizes actor interdependencies. The relevance and necessary involvement of local governments to implementing national policies is recognized, but the conflicting nature of their goals and the importance of their resources are not. The role and legitimacy of private and commercial policy actors barely register on the radar of policy programs. This makes the emergence of a substantial implementation gap in eco city development an almost predictable outcome. The likelihood of type 1 projects avoiding such implementation difficulties is far higher, because here the relevance, legitimacy and involvement of public and private parties at various levels is taken as an essential ingredient for decision-making, investment and quality-control.
However, realistically, how many local eco city projects around the country can the Chinese central government commit itself to in terms of active, hands-on involvement?
Conclusions and implications
The Chinese national eco city, low carbon city and low carbon eco city programs enacted by three different ministries in Beijing have set in motion a country-wide process whereby local governments volunteer to become officially endorsed demonstrator cities. Such recognition is bestowed on them in exchange for the responsibility to implement national policy locally, and the expectation to apply variously defined indicator frameworks as an essentially technocratic means of assessing and controlling how much social, economic and environmental progress is made with selected demonstrator projects.
Unfortunately, most local governments fail to meet key sustainability standards, and many do not (or only inadequately) measure and monitor the performance of their demonstrator projects at all. What we have attempted to show in this article is that most policy frameworks undertaken by the national ministries do not sufficiently recognize the constellation of the M A N U S C R I P T
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policy networks in which their eco city programs are implemented. Since local governments have different goals and their compliance is not something that can be assumed as automatic, central government tends to underestimate its dependence on collaboration with local governments and developers. While China's tax sharing system obliges local governments to obtain revenues from leasing out land to developers and, therefore, require them to be primarily receptive to third-party funders, national ministries act as if local governments will voluntarily establish and apply eco city frameworks without financial compensation. Should they not do so, stricter enforcement practices will follow. Recently, national programs, such as those for eco civilization demonstration cities, sponge cities and smart cities, embrace the same top-down steering mechanism and are, therefore, likely to incur the same implementation problems as the ones analyzed in this article. These newer initiatives only add to the fragmentation of the eco progress policy the Chinese government has come to adopt over the last decade or two.
A more effective way of encouraging local governments in China to engage actively in the implementation of ecological cities would be to change the calculus of their institutional incentives (Similar conclusions are drawn in a recent urban policy review for China by OECD, 2015; see in particular Chapter 3 therein.). Since the need for land revenues defines much of their current eagerness to issue large volumes of land and embark on sizeable urbanization projects, unsustainable practices is de facto ingrained in China's institutional structure for urban development. And since turning all eco city projects into type 1 developments is practically hardly realistic, minimizing local government dependency on land use revenues may be the only feasible way forward to achieving more effective policy implementation and high-quality outcomes for eco city development in China. This may in fact also be a necessary counter measure against the considerable oversupply of real estate in recent years.
It is likely, then, that the (re-)configuration of multi-level and multi-lateral governance arrangements, and related questions of policy implementation, will surface and occupy the political agenda in China in years to come. MEP, 2005 MEP, , 2006 MEP, , 2007 MEP, , 2013a MEP, , 2015 MOHURD, 2011a, b; Mu, 2010; NDRC, 2010 NDRC, , 2012 
